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Abstract
For a large number of infectious diseases, vaccination is the most effective way to
prevent an epidemic. However, the vaccine stockpile is hardly ever sufficient to treat
the entire population, which brings about the challenge of vaccine allocation. To aid
decision makers facing this challenge, we provide insights into the structure of this
problem.
We first investigate the dependence of health benefit on the fraction of people that
receive vaccination, where we define health benefit as the total number of people that
escape infection. We start with the seminal SIR compartmental model. Using implicit
function analysis, we prove the existence of a unique vaccination fraction that maxi-
mizes the health benefit per dose of vaccine, and that the health benefit per dose of
vaccine decreases monotonically when moving away from this fraction in either direc-
tion. Surprisingly, this fraction does not coincide with the so-called critical vaccination
coverage that has been advocated in literature. We extend these insights to other
compartmental models such as the SEIR model.
These results allow us to provide new insights into vaccine allocation to multiple
non-interacting or weakly interacting populations. We explain the counter-intuitive
switching behavior of optimal allocation. We show that allocations that maximize
health benefits are rarely equitable, while equitable allocations may be significantly
non-optimal.
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1 Introduction
Infectious diseases have heavily influenced the course of history, and in recent years we have
seen new emerging epidemics due to the SARS coronavirus in 2003, the novel influenza A
H1N1 virus in 2009, the MERS-coronavirus in 2013, and the Ebola virus in 2014. A large
outbreak brings about deaths, health losses and economic losses. Research on preventing an
epidemic or mitigating its consequences is thus of high priority. Vaccination is one of the
most effective ways to prevent an epidemic. However, the vaccine stockpile is hardly ever
sufficient to vaccinate the entire population. This brings about an allocation problem: How
should the doses of vaccine be allocated when they become available?
A reasonable objective for vaccine allocation is maximizing the number of people that
escape infection. This objective may be achieved by evaluating the eventual outcome of
alternative allocations by projecting the course of the epidemic numerically (e.g., Keeling
and Shattock 2012, Yuan et al. 2015) or via simulation (e.g., Ferguson et al. 2005, Cooper
et al. 2006). This approach may use detailed models and thus yield sophisticated allocations,
but it does not give a high-level explanation of why certain allocations yield a higher health
benefit. This is especially problematic because the resulting allocations are often inequitable
and behave counter-intuitively, as illustrated in Table 1. For example, Population 1 has
priority over Population 2 when 2000 doses are available, but this priority switches at 8000
doses and again at 20000 doses. Similar puzzling outcomes have been observed in various
models (Rowthorn et al. 2009, Klepac et al. 2011, Keeling and Shattock 2012, Yuan et al.
2015), but remain poorly understood.
Vaccine stockpile Population 1 Population 2 Population 3
2000 2000 0 0
5000 4200 800 0
8000 0 8000 0
10000 1900 8100 0
15000 0 0 15000
20000 3600 0 16400
25000 0 8200 16800
30000 4100 8500 17400
Table 1: The optimal vaccine allocation over three non-interacting populations (rounded to
the nearest hundred). The sizes of population 1, 2 and 3 are respectively 10000, 20000 and
40000 and the fractions of people initially infected are 0.015, 0.012 and 0.010. (Section 3
contains a detailed description of the model and Section 5 gives the parameters used for this
table.)
We propose to apply analytical methods to vaccine allocation to gain insights into the
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structure of the optimal allocation. We expect that a research agenda along these lines will
yield a high-level understanding of the inequitable and seemingly counter-intuitive outcomes
of a broad range of models. Equity versus efficiency has been studied in various health care
applications (e.g., Zaric and Brandeau 2007, McCoy and Lee 2014). In this paper we derive
analytical insights that explain why an efficient allocation is often inequitable.
Our main contribution in this paper is making a first step towards developing such
analytical insights by studying a seminal class of epidemic models: The compartmental
models introduced by Kermack and McKendrick (1927). These models divide the population
into different compartments that represent all people that are in the same disease state.
We initially focus on the classical SIR model, which consists of three compartments that
respectively contain susceptible (S), infected (I), and removed (R) people. People can be
in the removed compartment because of recovery and immunity, successful vaccination or
death. We define the health benefits in this model in terms of the total number of people
that escape infection. Vaccination affects health benefit in two ways: directly for people that
are vaccinated, and indirectly for people that are not vaccinated by reducing their disease
exposure.
We first investigate the total health benefit as a function of the vaccination fraction
that is used. This function has long resisted analysis because it cannot be characterized
explicitly. Our analysis departs from an implicit relation that extends the final size equation
(Diekmann et al. 2012). We completely characterize the dependence. For example, we prove
that the health benefits are convex-concave in the vaccination fraction. This implies the
existence of a unique vaccination fraction that maximizes the health benefits per dose of
vaccine, our dose-optimal vaccination fraction. We show that health benefits per dose of
vaccine decrease monotonically when moving away from this fraction in either direction.
Surprisingly, this fraction is different from the so-called critical vaccination coverage that
has been advocated in literature (e.g., Keeling and Shattock 2012, Plans-Rubio´ 2012). We
next extend our analysis to other compartmental models, e.g., the so-called SEIR model.
We then apply these results to optimal vaccine allocation in multiple non- and weakly
interacting populations. We establish links to resource allocation literature (Ginsberg 1974,
Ag˘ralı and Geunes 2009). For the non-interacting case, we characterize the form of the opti-
mal solution. We provide detailed insights explaining both the switching behavior of Table 1
and the highly non-equitable allocations that arise from the health benefit maximizing cri-
terion. For cases with weak interaction, we illustrate how to apply the insights gained from
the non-interactive case.
We hope that these first steps yielding high-level analytical insights into vaccine allo-
cation invite further research into this area. A better high-level understanding of a broad
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range of vaccine allocation models may aid policy-makers in grasping the sometimes puzzling
outcomes of vaccine allocation models.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an extensive liter-
ature review to position our work. In Section 3 the vaccine allocation problem is formulated.
The objective of maximizing the number of people that escape infection is further analyzed
in Section 4 and the dose-optimal vaccination fraction is presented. Based on this analysis,
the structure of the solution to the vaccine allocation problem is presented in Section 5. Sec-
tion 6 discusses the generality of the results and the effect of the assumptions. We conclude
in Section 7.
2 Literature
There are many different ways to model the spread of an epidemic in a population. These
range from deterministic models with differential equations based on Kermack and McK-
endrick (1927), stochastic Markov formulations (e.g., Lefevre 1979) and simulation models
(e.g., Ferguson et al. 2005). An excellent overview of mathematical methods to analyze
epidemic models is given by Diekmann et al. (2012).
These models are often used to describe the evolution of an epidemic in multiple pop-
ulations that differ geographically (e.g., Sattenspiel and Dietz 1995, Arino and Van den
Driessche 2003). Others distinguish between age groups (e.g., Mylius et al. 2008, Medlock
et al. 2009, Goldstein et al. 2009) or between people heavily contributing to the transmis-
sion of the disease and those who are very vulnerable (e.g., Goldstein et al. 2012). Another
approach is to focus on households and see them as minor sub-populations (e.g., Becker and
Starczak 1997, Ball and Lyne 2002, Keeling and Ross 2015). In this paper we study non-
interacting and weakly interacting populations. Our insights thus apply to geographically
distant populations.
Vaccination is one of the interventions often studied and included in epidemiological
models. Some studies consider vaccination in a completely susceptible population (e.g.,
Keeling and Shattock 2012, Yuan et al. 2015). Others compare optimal vaccination strategies
on different points in time and show how the optimal allocation depends on the moment of
vaccination (Mylius et al. 2008, Medlock et al. 2009, Matrajt and Longini Jr 2010, Matrajt
et al. 2013). Vaccination during an epidemic is especially realistic in the context of an
unknown disease as a vaccine needs to be developed in that case (cf. Bowman et al. 2011).
There are different ways to evaluate the effect of interventions such as vaccination. One
way is to use cost-effectiveness analysis or cost minimization of an allocation (Hethcote and
Waltman 1973, Brandeau et al. 2003, Boulier et al. 2007, Simons et al. 2011). However, most
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papers consider epidemic characteristics instead of costs. The final size, also referred to as
the infection attack rate, is broadly used (e.g., Arino et al. 2006, Matrajt and Longini Jr
2010, Keeling and Shattock 2012). It measures the total number (or the fraction) of people
infected during an epidemic. An implicit analytical expression for the final size can be
derived from the Kermack and McKendrick model (cf. Diekmann et al. 2012). This final
size equation may be shown to hold for a broad range of model specifications (Keeling and
Shattock 2012, Ma and Earn 2006). Our objective also corresponds to minimizing the final
size: an extension of the final size size equation serves as the starting point of our analysis.
In contrast, Cairns (1989) and Goldstein et al. (2009) investigate how to minimize the basic
reproduction ratio R0 (cf. Wallinga et al. 2010). Others analyze the allocations that result
in the threshold R0 = 1 (e.g., Becker and Starczak 1997, Tanner et al. 2008). R0 is a myopic
criterion, because it corresponds to the initial growth rate, whereas the more traditional final
size criterion considers the entire time course of the epidemic. While the former criterion
leads to a much more tractable model, the latter approach may be more appropriate in many
cases.
Many researchers have identified the optimal intervention strategy by determining the
eventual outcome of alternatives using simulation models (e.g. Ferguson et al. 2005, Cooper
et al. 2006, Germann et al. 2006, Halloran et al. 2008, Tuite et al. 2010, Uribe-Sa´nchez et al.
2011) or numerical evaluation (e.g. Mylius et al. 2008, Keeling and Shattock 2012, Yuan et al.
2015). But to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to use an analytical approach to
provide structural insights explaining why certain interventions are eventually most effective.
Our main technical contribution is providing a detailed mathematical analysis of the final
size in the seminal SIR model. We show the convex-concave structure and prove that there
is an unique vaccination fraction that yields the highest health benefits per dose of vaccine:
the dose-optimal vaccination fraction. The term dose-optimal is also used by Ball and Lyne
(2002) for a vaccine allocation that minimizes R0 under different model specifications. In
general, dose-optimality refers to the most efficient use of available doses of vaccine.
A result on convexity of the final size is found by Wu et al. (2007) for the significantly
simplified case of vaccination in a completely susceptible population and for a limited range of
vaccination fractions. We study the general model that holds for vaccination at any possible
time during or before the outbreak and for all possible vaccination fractions. This general
setting leads to the discovery of the dose-optimal vaccination fraction, which plays a crucial
role in the optimal allocation. The analytical insights we obtain may help practitioners to
better understand the sometimes counter-intuitive outcomes a broad range of models.
By leveraging the results we obtain for the final size of the epidemic, we analyze the vac-
cine allocation problem and establish a link to resource allocation literature. This literature
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investigates for example the allocation of resources among several production plants of a firm
(Ginsberg 1974) or the allocation of a limited budget over multiple investments (Ag˘ralı and
Geunes 2009). We show that connecting Operations Management to epidemiology yields
interesting insights, which is in line with the growing interest for applications in health care
and infectious diseases in the Operations Management community. Recent work in this area
focuses on influenza vaccine composition (e.g. Wu et al. 2005, Cho 2010), resource allocation
for HIV (e.g. Deo and Sohoni 2015) and vaccine allocation (Sun et al. 2009). In this latter
paper game theory is used to analyze whether or not countries should share their vaccine
stockpile with other countries.
3 Vaccine allocation
Vaccinating in multiple populations brings about the question of allocation: How should the
available doses of vaccine be divided over the populations? This paper models the spread of
an epidemic using the seminal deterministic SIR model, which is explained in Section 3.1. In
Section 3.2, we derive an implicit analytical relation that characterizes the final state of the
epidemic, which extends the so-called final size equation to arbitrary starting conditions. The
vaccine allocation problem is formulated in Section 3.3. We keep ourselves to a deterministic
model; for discussion of stochastic models we refer to Section 7.
3.1 The SIR model
Let J denote the set of populations. Every population is divided into three compartments
for which the time course is tracked (cf. Hethcote 2000). Let sj(t), ij(t) and rj(t) be the
fractions of the population respectively susceptible, infected and removed in population j at
time t. People who have died will remain in the removed compartment. By interpretation it
must hold that sj(t) + ij(t) + rj(t) = 1 for all t ≥ 0 and all j ∈ J . The following system of
differential equations is proposed by Kermack and McKendrick (1927), with the transmission
rate and the rate of recovery in population j denoted by βj and γj, respectively.
dsj
dt
= −βjsjij
dij
dt
= βjsjij − γjij
drj
dt
= γjij
(1)
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From (1) the following equation follows, which presents the relation between ij(t) and sj(t)
at any time t (Hethcote 1976):
ij(t) = −sj(t) + log(sj(t))
σj
+ s0,j + i0,j − log(s0,j)
σj
(2)
Here i0,j := ij(0) and s0,j := sj(0) are the initial fractions infected and susceptible, where
we assume 0 < i0,j < 1, 0 < s0,j < 1 and 0 < s0,j + i0,j ≤ 1. We define σj = βjγj , which
is assumed to be strictly positive. Note that σj equals the basic reproduction ratio R0 for
the SIR model (Diekmann et al. 2012). For i0,j = 0 there is no transmission, resulting in
ij(t) = 0 for all t ≥ 0. However, in the remainder of the paper we will use i0,j = 0 to refer to
the limit i0,j ↓ 0. Vaccination for the limit i0,j ↓ 0 is sometimes referred to as prophylactic
vaccination (e.g Keeling and Shattock 2012, Yuan et al. 2015), but we will not use this term
as this may lead to confusion with the medical definition of prophylactic vaccination.
3.2 Vaccination
To evaluate the effect of vaccination allocation, assume that at t = τv,j a fraction fj of
the susceptible population in population j is vaccinated, with 0 ≤ fj ≤ 1. Just prior to
vaccination the system is in state (sj(τv,j), ij(τv,j)). By assumption
dsj
dt
< 0 at t = 0, such
that 0 < sj(τv,j) ≤ s0,j for τv,j ≥ 0. Assume that the vaccine is completely effective and that
vaccination takes no time. Assume that it is possible to identify the susceptible people and
that vaccination with a single dose results in immunity immediately. We refer to Section 6
for a discussion of these assumptions. Under our assumptions vaccination causes a shift at
time τv,j from state (sj(τv,j), ij(τv,j)) to state ((1 − fj)sj(τv,j), ij(τv,j)). This implies that
rj(τv,j) shifts to rj(τv,j) + fjsj(τv,j).
In order to evaluate different allocations, we use the characteristics of the final state of
the epidemic, i.e., the disease-free equilibrium. In particular we analyze the final fraction of
susceptible people. This value fully characterizes the disease-free equilibrium, since sj(t) +
ij(t) + rj(t) = 1 and ij(t) = 0 in the disease-free equilibrium.
We define Gj(fj) as the final fraction of people susceptible in population j after vacci-
nating a fraction fj of the susceptible people at time τv,j. More precisely,
Gj(fj) = lim
t→+∞
sj(t), (3)
with sj(t) evolving according to (1) for t > τv,j. The final fraction of people susceptible is
related to a concept which is often called ‘herd immunity’ (cf. Fine 1993, John and Samuel
2000). In the latter paper the term ‘herd effect’ is used and defined as the reduction of
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infection or disease in the unimmunized segment as a result of immunizing a proportion of
the population. The function Gj(fj) measures this herd effect in population j. Section 4
studies the herd effect function Gj(fj) in more detail.
3.3 The vaccine allocation problem
Let Nj denote the size of population j and denote by V the size of the available vaccine
stockpile. Define Fj(fj) as the fraction of people that escape infection in population j:
Fj(fj) = fjsj(τv,j) +Gj(fj) (4)
As can be seen in (4) there are two ways of escaping infection: either you will get vaccinated
(the first term) or you will escape infection without being vaccinated (the second term).
These two terms exactly correspond to the direct effect and the herd effect of vaccination.
As discussed in the introduction, our objective is minimizing the final size of the epi-
demic, i.e., the total number of people that get infected. In fact, it will be more convenient
to maximize the total number of people that escape infection, which can be more easily
expressed in Fj(fj), j ∈ J . An allocation that maximizes this number exploits the available
resources in the most effective way. This gives rise to the following vaccine allocation problem
(cf. Keeling and Shattock 2012):
max
∑
j∈J
NjFj(fj)
s.t.
∑
j∈J
fjsj(τv,j)Nj ≤ V
0 ≤ fj ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ J
(5)
Theorem A.5 proves that the constraint
∑
j∈J fjsj(τv,j)Nj ≤ V will always be met with
equality. Thus, any optimal allocation will use the entire vaccine stockpile.
The final size of the epidemic may be expressed as Zj(fj) = s0,j + i0,j − Fj(fj) and (5)
is thus formally equivalent to a minimization problem involving this final size. The relation
between Zj(fj) and the two components of Fj(fj) is illustrated in Figure 1.
4 Analysis of the objective function
In order to study Problem (5), this section analyzes the function Fj(fj) = fjsj(τv,j) +Gj(fj)
and in particular the function Gj(fj). For notational convenience, the subscript j will be
dropped in this section.
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Figure 1: The final state of the epidemic for different vaccination fractions, for an epidemic
with basic reproduction ratio σ = 2 with (s0, i0) = (0.99, 0.01) and τv = 0.
An implicit relation that characterizes G(f), i.e., the herd effect, is given in Section 4.1
and this expression is analyzed in Section 4.2. Based on this analysis we present our dose-
optimal vaccination fraction in Section 4.3. We extend our analysis to more general com-
partmental models in Section 4.4. A minor detail is sorted out in Section 4.5: we formally
confirm that it is optimal to vaccinate as early as possible.
Figure 2 summarizes the main findings of this section and illustrates the structure of
G(f). In Section 4.2 and 4.3 this result is derived formally.
4.1 Implicit formulation of the function G(f)
We derive an implicit relation that characterizesG(f) and that forms the basis of our analysis.
Note that the state ((1− fj)sj(τv,j), ij(τv,j)) directly after vaccination can be seen as a new
initial state, where ij(τv,j) can be obtained from (2). Gj(fj) is then obtained from (2) by
setting ij(t) = 0 and thus is the unique solution to:
0 = −Gj(fj) + log(Gj(fj))
σj
+ (1− fj)sj(τv,j) + ij(τv,j)− log((1− fj)s(τv,j))
σj
⇔ 0 = −Gj(fj) + log(Gj(fj))
σj
+ s0,j + i0,j − log(s0,j(1− fj))
σj
− fjsj(τv,j)
(6)
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Figure 2: Illustration of the structure of G(f), which is proven in Section 4: Theorems 1 and 2
establish the increasing-decreasing and convex-concave structure of G(f), the fraction of
non-vaccinated people that escape infection, which is illustrated in this figure using the
parameters (s0, i0) = (0.99, 0.01), σ = 3 and τv = 0. Dashed lines represent the important
vaccination fractions f¯ (left), f ∗ (right) and our dose-optimal vaccination fraction f˜ following
from Corollary 1 (middle).
Above equation holds for all i0,j > 0. The value of Gj(fj) in the limit i0,j ↓ 0 can be
determined by substituting i0,j = 0. (6) extends the final size equation to any initial state.
The original final size equation can be recovered for fj = 0, s0,j → 1 and i0,j → 0 (see e.g.,
Kermack and McKendrick (1927), Ma and Earn (2006), Diekmann et al. (2012) and Keeling
and Shattock (2012)).
We refer to Appendix D for an alternative expression of G(f) using the Lambert W
function denoted by W (x) (cf. Corless et al. 1996, Ma and Earn 2006).
4.2 Analysis of the herd effect
In this and the next section we present the main technical contribution of this paper: a
structural analysis of the herd effect, i.e., the function G(f). All proofs can be found in
Appendix A. For the analysis we distinguish between two types of vaccination: vaccination in
a completely susceptible population (the limit i0 ↓ 0) or vaccination in an infected population
10
(i(τv) > 0).
Lemma 1. The function G(f) is twice differentiable for all f ∈ [0, 1) in case of vaccination
in an infected population (i0 > 0) and twice differentiable for all f ∈ [0, 1) with f 6= 1− 1σs(τv)
in case of vaccination in a completely susceptible population (the limit i0 ↓ 0).
Theorem 1. For s(τv) >
1
σ
there is a unique vaccination fraction f ∗ = 1 − 1
σs(τv)
> 0
such that the herd effect G(f) is increasing in f for all f < f ∗, maximized for f = f ∗ and
decreasing for f > f ∗. For s(τv) ≤ 1σ the function G(f) is decreasing for all f ∈ [0, 1]. If
i0 > 0, then G
′(f ∗) = 0.
Note that the vaccination fraction f ∗ also plays a role in the critical vaccination coverage,
denoted by pc (cf. Diekmann et al. (2012)). This critical vaccination coverage is defined as
the smallest fraction of people that must be vaccinated in a completely susceptible population
in order to prevent an outbreak (an increase in the fraction of people infected) and equals
pc = 1− 1σ . Observe that pc = f ∗ for s(τv) = 1.
To study the effect of one additional dose of vaccine, we consider the convexity and
concavity of the function G(f). We consider G(f) to be convex if the second order derivative
is non-negative and concave if the second order derivative is non-positive.
Theorem 2. Denote by W [·] the Lambert W function (cf. Appendix D) and let C be defined
as follows:
C =
W [−σ exp{−σ(s0 + i0) + log(s0)}] + 2
σ
For s(τv) > C there exists a unique vaccination fraction f¯ > 0 such that G(f) is strictly
convex (G′′(f) > 0) for all f < f¯ and strictly concave (G′′(f) < 0) for all f > f¯ . For
s(τv) ≤ C the function G(f) is concave for all f ∈ [0, 1]. If i0 > 0, then G′′(f¯) = 0.
Recall that G(f) represents the herd effect: the fraction of people that escapes infection
without being vaccinated. G′(f) thus represents the impact of an additional dose of vaccine
on the herd effect for different vaccination fractions. By Theorems 1 and 2, this impact is
initially positive and increasing, then it starts to decrease to eventually become negative.
Lemma 2 will show that f¯ ≤ f ∗. Using Theorems 1 and 2 we can thus distinguish three
cases for the function G(f): (i) the function is first convex and increasing, then concave
and increasing and finally concave and decreasing, (ii) the function is always concave and is
first increasing and then decreasing, or (iii) the function is always concave and decreasing.
Figure 2 graphically illustrates the most general shape (i) of the function G(f). Observe
that for f ↑ 1 the herd effect goes to zero: Vaccinating all susceptible people implies that
there are no people left that could be spared from infection without being vaccinated.
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4.3 The dose-optimal vaccination fraction
We introduce the function D(f) as the average slope of the function G(f) on the interval
[0, f ], measuring the average herd effect per dose of vaccine:
D(f) =
1
f
[G(f)−G(0)] (7)
Corollary 1. The function D(f) as defined by (7) is maximized by the unique vaccination
fraction f˜ for which G′(f˜) = D(f). The function D(f) is increasing for f < f˜ and decreasing
for f > f˜ .
Corollary 1 is illustrated in Figure 3. The interpretation of Corollary 1 is that f˜ gives
the highest herd effect per dose of vaccine. We therefore introduce the term dose-optimal
vaccination fraction for f˜ . In Section 5 we will show that f˜ plays a central role in optimal
vaccine allocation.
Figure 3: The function G(f), its derivative G′(f) and the function D(f) for an infection
with a basic reproduction ratio σ = 2 when vaccination is offered at time τv = 0. The
left panel shows the case of vaccination in an infected population with initial conditions
(s0, i0) = (0.99, 0.01). In this case we have f¯ ≈ 0.341, the dose-optimal vaccination fraction
f˜ ≈ 0.417 and the critical vaccination coverage f ∗ = 0.5. The right panel shows the case of
vaccination in a completely susceptible population, with initial conditions (s0, i0) = (1, 0).
In this case we have f¯ = f˜ = f ∗ = 0.5.
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σ 2 3 5 10 15 20 25 30 50 100
f ∗ 0.4949 0.6633 0.7980 0.8990 0.9327 0.9495 0.9596 0.9663 0.9798 0.9899
f˜ 0.4175 0.6255 0.7824 0.8944 0.9304 0.9481 0.9586 0.9656 0.9795 0.9898
f¯ 0.3410 0.5465 0.7158 0.8483 0.8946 0.9186 0.9333 0.9434 0.9642 0.9810
Table 2: The table illustrates that for increasing basic reproduction ratio σ the dose-optimal
vaccination fraction f˜ converges to f ∗. To calculate the numbers an initial state (s0, i0) =
(0.99, 0.01) and s(τv) = 0.99 is used.
Lemma 2. Consider the following three vaccination fractions: f¯ as defined in Theorem 2,
the dose-optimal vaccination fraction f˜ and f ∗ as defined in Theorem 1. The following
relation holds: f¯ ≤ f˜ ≤ f ∗
Recall that the critical vaccination fraction pc = 1 − 1σ is equal to f ∗ = 1 − 1σs(τv) in
case of vaccination in a completely susceptible population (s(τv) = 1). From Lemma 2 and
Lemma A.2 we can derive that f¯ = f˜ = f ∗ = pc in that case. This is illustrated in the right
graph of Figure 3. Another relation between f˜ and f ∗ is presented in the following lemma:
Lemma 3. For increasing σ the dose-optimal vaccine fraction f˜ converges to f ∗.
This lemma is illustrated in Table 2, which shows that very high σ is needed to obtain
convergence.
4.4 The SEIR model and other extensions
An important extension of the standard SIR compartmental model is the SInR model with
n different consecutive infectious stages. This extension allows to include a latent period or
multiple levels of infectivity. For n = 2 this model is often referred to as the SEIR model.
Let βk and γk denote respectively the transmission rate and recovery rate in infectious stage
k. Hyman et al. (1999) prove that R0 =
∑n
k=1
βk
γk
for this model. Ma and Earn (2006) show
that the final size equation derived from the SIR model also holds for the SInR model for
s(0)→ 1 and without vaccination. We extend the generality of the final size equation for the
SInR model to any initial state and include vaccination. Proofs can be found in Appendix B.
Theorem 3. Up to a constant, the expression for G(f) given in (6) also applies to the SInR
model with σ =
∑n
k=1
βk
γk
.
Corollary 2. The results of Lemma 1, Theorem 1, Theorem 2 and Corollary 1 also apply
to the SInR model with σ =
∑n
k=1
βk
γk
.
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Lemma 1, Theorem 1, Theorem 2 and Corollary 1 form the basis for the analysis of the
vaccine allocation problem in Section 5. By Corollary 2 the results derived in Section 5 are
valid for the more general SInR model.
4.5 Vaccination in a single population
We sort out a minor detail by formally proving that vaccination should be carried out as soon
as possible. Thereto we determine the time τv at which G(f, s(τv)) + fs(τv) is maximized.
Assume that we have a fixed vaccine stockpile, V , such that a fraction of the population can
be vaccinated is restricted by V
Ns(τv)
, where N is the population size. If s(τv) ≤ V/N , all
susceptible people can be vaccinated and the objective function for f = 1 reduces to s(τv),
because limf↑1G(f) = 0 by Theorem A.1. If s(τv) > V/N , all available doses of vaccine
are used and f = V
Ns(τv)
. Let G′s(τv)(f, s(τv)) be the derivative of G(f, s(τv)) with respect to
s(τv):
G′s(τv)(f, s(τv))
[
1− 1
σG(f, s(τv))
]
=
−V/N
σs(τv)[s(τv)− V/N ]
Observe that the objective function is increasing in s(τv), because G(f, s(τv)) <
1
σ
by Theo-
rem A.2. Therefore, to maximize the number of people that do not get infected one should
vaccinate as soon as possible.
5 Analysis of the vaccine allocation problem
In this section we analyze the vaccine allocation problem (5), using the characterization of the
objective function in Theorems 1 and 2. Section 5.1 presents the central insight. Section 5.2
considers an interesting special case to obtain more insight into the structure of the solution.
The general case is discussed in Section 5.3. In Section 5.4 we illustrate how the insights
from the non-interactive case can be applied to populations with weak interaction.
5.1 The optimal allocation
In this section we characterize the optimal allocation, which is the solution to problem (5).
We emphasize that our analysis in Section 4 is essential to obtain this insight. By Theorem 2
let f¯j denote the vaccination fraction such that F
′′
j (f) > 0 for all f < f¯j and F
′′
j (f) < 0 for
f > f¯j.
Theorem 4 (Central Insight). For every optimal solution to (5) there exist J ′ ⊆ J , k ∈ J\J ′
and ω ≥ 0 such that:
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(i). For all j ∈ J ′, fj is the unique solution to 1sj(τv,j)F ′j(fj) = ω for which fj ≥ f¯j.
(ii). 1
sk(τv,k)
F ′k(fk) = ω, and either fk is the unique solution to this equation for which fk ≥ f¯k
or fk is the unique solution for which fk < f¯k.
(iii). Either fj = 0 or fj = 1 for all j ∈ J \ {J ′ ∪ {k}}.
In case vaccination takes place before the peak in infected people is attained, i.e.,
sj(τv,j) >
1
σj
for all j ∈ J , condition (iii) in Theorem 4 reduces to the following by Lemma C.2:
Either fj = 0 for all j ∈ J \ {J ′ ∪ {k}} or fj = 1 for all j ∈ J \ {J ′ ∪ {k}}.
Given a subset J ′ ⊆ J we use the term partial pro rata allocation to denote an allocation
that meets condition (i) of Theorem 4. The optimal vaccine allocation is thus partial pro
rata over a subset J ′ of populations. Possibly some leftover vaccines are allocated to one
population k. The remaining populations are completely vaccinated or not vaccinated at all.
The optimal allocation is thus driven by the goal to make the best possible use of the herd
effect in some populations, which is in line with the numerical results of Wu et al. (2007)
and the intuitive explanation of Keeling and Shattock (2012).
5.2 The special case: identical parameters
Now consider an interesting special case: the case of identical functions Fj(fj) := F (fj) for
all j ∈ J (σj := σ, sj0 := s0, ij0 := i0, τv,j := τv and sj(τv,j) = s(τv) for all j ∈ J). In that
case a partial pro rata allocation is a pro rata allocation, with pro rata as usual denoting an
allocation in which the doses of vaccine are distributed equally with respect to population
size, such that the vaccination fraction is the same in all selected populations. For this special
case the optimal allocation may be characterized in more detail. In the context of investing
in factories Ginsberg (1974) have derived similar results for the special case Fj(0) = 0 and
Nj = N for all j.
Observe that the dose-optimal vaccination fraction f˜ as defined by Corollary 1 does not
only maximize the function D(f). It also maximizes the average slope of the function F (f)
on the interval [0, f ], calculated as [F (f)−F (0)]/f , because F (f) = fs(τv) +G(f). Thus, f˜
is the allocation fraction that gives per dose of vaccine the highest total effect, which consists
of the herd effect and the direct effect. The optimal allocation therefore tries to allocate as
close as possible to f˜ in a subset of all the populations:
Theorem 5. Consider a set of populations J with ∀j: Fj(f) = F (f) and a total available
amount of resources equal to V . Let b = V
s(τv)
, |J | = n and order the populations such that
N1 ≤ ... ≤ Nn. The optimal allocation for particular cases is as follows:
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(a). if b < f˜N1, then allocate only to the smallest population. Set f1 = b/N1 and fj = 0 for
j = 2, ..., n.
(b). if b =
∑
j∈K f˜Nj for a subset K ⊆ J , then set xj = f˜ for j ∈ K and xj = 0 for j /∈ K.
(c). if b >
∑
j∈J f˜Nj, then allocate pro rata over all the populations: xj =
b∑
j∈J Nj
for all
j ∈ J .
The proof of this theorem can be found in Appendix C. Theorem 5 shows that the
optimal allocation tries to make the best possible use of the herd effect by vaccinating close
to f˜ in (a subset of) the populations. All vaccines are allocated to the smallest population
if the vaccination fraction f˜ cannot be attained in either of the populations. For very large
vaccine stockpiles, the pro rata allocation is optimal. Note that Theorem 5 only specifies
the allocation in specific cases of vaccine stockpiles, but can be extended to any available
amount of vaccines. However, the description of the optimal allocation for a general vaccine
stockpile is quite technical and less insightful and is therefore omitted.
In practice it is not always possible to vaccinate at the start of an epidemic (τv = 0),
because vaccines should be developed, ordered or produced. It is therefore useful to study
the effect of τv on the optimal allocation, which is governed by the dose-optimal vaccination
fraction f˜ .
Theorem 6. The value f˜ , which maximizes D(f) = [G(f)−G(0)]/f , decreases when s(τv)
decreases.
Recall from Theorem 5 that the pro rata allocation is optimal for V large enough to
reach f˜ in every population. Thus by Theorem 6, if vaccination takes place at a later point
in time, the pro rata allocation is already optimal for smaller vaccine stockpiles.
5.3 Discussion of the general case
The insights obtained in Section 5.2 by considering the special case can be translated to
the general case. Recall that a single dose of vaccine leads to a small herd effect in a
population, but multiple doses together can make a difference. We prove that the herd effect
is convex-concave in the vaccination fraction and thus vaccinating a second individual can
have a larger effect than vaccinating a first individual. However, when a very large fraction
of the population is vaccinated, the herd effect is decreasing. This leads to the dose-optimal
vaccination fraction f˜ , which gives the highest decrease in final size per dose of vaccine.
In the general case of the vaccine allocation problem the parameters may differ per
population, causing the functions Fj(·) to be different for different populations j. This
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implies that there is no longer a single value for f˜ , but an f˜j for every population j ∈ J .
Equivalent to vaccinating close to f˜j, we could say that there is an optimal number of vaccines
V˜j = f˜jsj(τv,j)Nj for every population j. We either come close to V˜j or we do not allocate to
population j. This explains the structure of the solution of the vaccine allocation problem: a
subset of populations is selected and we divide the vaccines over these populations such that
in these populations we vaccinate as close to V˜j as possible while respecting the conditions
of Theorem 4. This explains why the smallest populations are prioritized for small vaccine
stockpiles, as the required number of doses of vaccine to reach a fraction f˜j is smaller in
those populations. Numerical analysis of the optimal vaccine allocation (e.g., by Keeling
and Shattock (2012)) shows switch points where a small increase in vaccine stockpile results
in a completely different allocation. Our analysis explains these switch points: they are
related to a change in the subset of populations to approach the dose-optimal vaccination
fraction.
This structure of the optimal allocation is illustrated in Figure 4 where we use the example
from the introduction with three populations of size N1 = 10000, N2 = 20000 and N3 = 40000
respectively. The following parameters are used: a basic reproduction ratio σj = 2 for
j = 1, 2, 3 and let the initial states be (s10, i
1
0) = (0.985, 0.015), (s
2
0, i
2
0) = (0.988, 0.012) and
(s30, i
3
0) = (0.990, 0.010). Furthermore, let τv,j = 0 for j = 1, 2, 3. Observe that the number
of allocated vaccines in the populations that receive vaccination is indeed close to V˜j.
Table 3 presents the differences between using the equitable allocation and the optimal
allocation. Since the direct effect of vaccination is not affected by the allocation, we only
compare the additional herd effect:
additional herd effect =
∑
j∈J
Nj(Gj(fj)−Gj(0))
The table shows that the optimal allocation is significantly more effective in harnessing the
herd effect.
5.4 Weak interaction
We illustrate how the results derived from the non-interacting case can be applied in the
interacting case. The SIR model with interaction is given by the following differential
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Figure 4: The graphs present the optimal vaccine allocation (the solid lines) over three
populations for different sizes of vaccine stockpile. The dashed and dotted lines indicate the
important vaccination fractions: the dashed line in the middle equals V˜j = f˜jsj(τv,j)Nj, the
upper dotted line equals V ∗j = f
∗
j sj(τv,j)Nj and the lower dotted line equals V¯j = f¯jsj(τv,j)Nj.
The circles indicate the values from Table 1.
equations (Diekmann et al. 2012):
dsj
dt
= −
∑
k∈J
βj,ksjik
dij
dt
=
∑
k∈J
βj,ksjik − γjij
drj
dt
= γjij
(8)
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Vaccine stockpile Equitable Allocation Optimal Allocation Relative Improvement
2000 671.76 762.14 + 13.45%
5000 1742.47 2037.82 + 16.95%
8000 2893.30 3511.54 + 21.37%
10000 3707.30 4274.03 + 15.29%
15000 5912.18 6702.56 + 13.37%
20000 8350.69 8910.43 + 6.70%
25000 10930.50 11170.84 + 2.20%
30000 13255.30 13264.27 + 0.07%
Table 3: The additional herd effect for two different allocation strategies for various vaccine
stockpiles. The equitable allocation allocates pro rata over all populations and the optimal
allocation is specified in Table 1 and Figure 4. The population sizes are: N1 = 10000,
N2 = 20000 and N3 = 40000.
We determine the optimal allocation for an example with three populations. Let Nj denote
the population size of population j ∈ J . We use the following parameters: γj = 1 and
βj,j = β = 2 for all j ∈ J . The interaction is determined as follows: βj,k = 0.01β Nk∑
m 6=j Nm
for j, k ∈ J and j 6= k, such that ∑k 6=j βj,k = 0.01β for all j ∈ J : interaction between
populations is a factor 100 weaker than interaction within populations. This assumption of
week interaction between populations conforms to Wu et al. (2007) who note that individuals
spend on average more than 97% of their time in their home regions. Analogous to the non-
interacting case we denote by fj the fraction of susceptible people that is vaccinated at time
τv,j in population j. We use the same initial states and population sizes as in Section 5.3.
To apply our insights from Section 5.3 we consider the populations j ∈ J one by one,
varying the vaccination fraction for that population while fixing fk = 0 for k 6= j. Perhaps
surprisingly, we still observe the convex-concave relation between the final fraction of people
susceptible and the used vaccination fraction in that population. This enables us to compute
the important vaccination fractions f¯j, f˜j and f
∗
j by numerical evaluation of (8), taking
τv,j = 0 for all j ∈ J . To investigate the relation between the optimal allocation and the
important vaccination fractions, we graphically illustrate them in Figure 5. The optimal
allocation is determined via enumeration.
Note that the optimal allocation follows the same pattern as in the non-interacting case
(Figure 4), where the values V˜j determine the structure of the solution. In Figure 6 we
illustrate the relative performance of the solution to the non-interacting problem in the model
with interaction. We evaluate the additional herd effect and observe that the non-interacting
solution performs close to optimal and outperforms the pro rata allocation. Note that the
additional herd effect becomes negative for large vaccine stockpiles, because vaccinating
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many people leaves very few people susceptible. This implies that herd effect can be lower
for large vaccine stockpiles than for no vaccination, resulting in a negative additional herd
effect.
In Appendix E we analyze the optimal allocation for somewhat stronger interaction.
The figures with the optimal allocation are given in case interaction between populations is
respectively 0.02, 0.05 and 0.1 times the interaction within a population. From these figures
we conclude that as the interaction between populations increases, the switching behaviour
eventually disappears. For an interaction factor of 0.02 the switching pattern is still clearly
visible up to vaccine stockpiles of around 30% of the total population size. For a factor
0.05 switching priorities occur only for relatively small stockpiles and for a factor 0.1 the
optimal allocation does no longer display any switching behaviour. Yet for all compared
levels of interaction the optimal allocation of small vaccine stockpiles remains unequitable,
prioritizing only a subset of the populations.
6 Discussion
In this section we discuss the effect of modelling assumptions, extensions and the generality
of the results.
Our results hold under several relaxations of assumptions. We assume that vaccination
is completely effective and results in immunity directly. The effectiveness of a vaccine can
be incorporated with an additional parameter (Hill and Longini Jr 2003, Mylius et al. 2008,
cf.) and a delay in attained immunity can be incorporated in the parameter s(τv). These
small adjustments in the parameters do not change the structure of our results. We have
completely characterized the final size expression for the SIR model, but this expression
is also valid for other compartmental models such as the SInR model (see Section 4.4).
This implies that our results can be generalized to other model choices. We assume that
the susceptible people can be identified and that no vaccines are waisted on infected people.
This assumption is more justifiable for the SIR model than for the SInR model, as the latter
possibly contains latent phases. However, this assumption can be relaxed to vaccinating a
fraction of the total population instead of only the susceptible population. Vaccines are then
waisted on individuals that are already infected or immune. Under this adjusted assumption
our results still hold.
Numerical results show that the convex-concave pattern in the final fraction of people
susceptible also holds for a stochastic SIR model. This is an indication that the insights of
this paper carry over, although proving convexity is more difficult for the stochastic model.
Also for populations with weak interaction we numerically illustrate that the insights gained
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Figure 5: The graphs present the optimal vaccine allocation (the solid lines) over three
interacting populations for different sizes of vaccine stockpile. The dashed and dotted lines
indicate the important vaccination fractions: the dashed line in the middle equals V˜j =
f˜jsj(τv,j)Nj, the upper dotted line equals V
∗
j = f
∗
j sj(τv,j)Nj and the lower dotted line equals
V¯j = f¯jsj(τv,j)Nj.
from the non-interacting case can still be applied, which is in line with the findings of Wu
et al. (2007).
The results in this paper are established under the assumption that vaccination is the
only intervention used. However, in practice vaccination is often combined with treatment or
isolation of infected patients. These other interventions change the course of the epidemic by
influencing for example the transmission rate or the recovery rate. Further research is needed
to investigate how the results derived in this paper carry over when multiple interventions
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Figure 6: The left figure illustrates the relative performance of the optimal allocation for
the non-interacting case (Figure 4) and the pro rata allocation evaluated in the model with
interaction as described in Section 5.4. We evaluate the additional herd effect for vaccine
stockpiles up to size 550, because the right figure shows that for larger vaccine stockpiles the
additional herd effect becomes negative.
are combined.
Vaccination allocation has an ethical dimension, unlike many other resource allocation
problems where equity does not play a role. This paper shows that for small vaccine stockpiles
it is optimal to allocate only to a limited subset of populations. Only for large vaccine
stockpiles it is optimal to allocate to all populations. The policy that we describe as optimal
need not be the best policy if we also take equity considerations into account. Nevertheless,
the vaccination policies derived in this paper can be used as a benchmark to determine the
effects on the final size of an epidemic if a suboptimal policy is selected motivated by fairness.
Another possibility is to reserve a part of the vaccine stockpile for pro rata allocation and
allocate the remaining vaccines optimally (cf. Kaplan and Merson 2002, Wu et al. 2007). In
this way policymakers are able to make a trade off between equity and health benefits.
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7 Conclusions and future directions
In this paper we analyze the optimal allocation of a vaccine stockpile in order to maximize
the health benefit, where we define health benefit as the total number of people that escape
infection. We prove that the health benefit is convex-concave in the vaccination fraction. We
then prove the existence of a unique vaccination fraction that results in the highest health
benefit per dose of vaccine and introduce the term dose-optimal for this fraction. Based on
this result we characterize the solution of the vaccination allocation problem and provide
links to resource allocation literature.
This study uses an analytical approach to determine the essential problem characteristics
that govern the structure of the solution. This implies that the structure of the solution can
be generalized to problems with the same characteristics. Further research may thus yield
an understanding of the optimal vaccine allocation for a broad range of models, including
interaction and stochasticity. Eventually, such a high level understanding of a range of
vaccine allocation models may increase the adoption of such models by policy-makers, who
may hesitate accepting puzzling modelling outcomes without knowing what causes these
outcomes.
Applying Operations Management in Health Care is increasingly becoming popular, also
in the context of infectious diseases (e.g., Ekici et al. 2013, Deo and Sohoni 2015). This
paper gives rise to many interesting research directions for multidisciplinary and potentially
high impact research.
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Supplement - Dose-optimal vaccine allocation over multiple popu-
lations
Appendix A Analysis of the herd effect - Lemmas and
theorems
This appendix consists of theorems that describe the characteristics of the function G(f).
The proofs for Lemma 1, Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 are presented as well as other results
required for these proofs.
We need that the differential equations (1) have a solution s(t), i(t) and r(t) for all t
which conforms to intuition: all fractions are between 0 and 1, s(t) is non-increasing over
time and r(t) non-decreasing over time. We omit this technical result for brevity.
Theorem A.1. It holds that G(f) > 0 for all f ∈ [0, 1) and limf↑1G(f) = 0.
Proof. Consider the characterization of G(f) in (22). Note that W [0] = 0 and W [x] < 0 for
−1
e
≤ x < 0 (Appendix D). In our case x = −σ exp{−σB(f, σ)}, with limf↑1B(f, σ) = +∞.
Thus, x < 0 for f ∈ [0, 1) and approaches 0 for f ↑ 1. Therefore, W [x] < 0 and G(f) > 0
for f ∈ [0, 1) and limf↑1G(f) = 0.
Theorem A.2. It holds that G(f) < 1
σ
for all f ∈ [0, 1] under the assumption that i0 > 0.
Proof. The differential equations in (1) show that i(t) is maximized when s(t) = 1/σ. Note
that G(f) describes the fraction of people susceptible, when the pandemic has died out.
Therefore, if G(f) = 1/σ, the function i(t) is maximal when the pandemic has died out, so
i(t) is at most equal to 0. This contradicts our assumption that i0 > 0. Using the same
argument, it can be noted that it is not possible for G(f) to be greater than 1/σ. As long
as s(t) > 1/σ, the number of infectives is increasing, thereby reducing s(t). In a final state,
when i(+∞) = 0, it must always hold that the fraction of susceptible people is below 1/σ,
which completes the proof.
Theorem A.3. It holds that G(f) < (1 − f)s(τv) for all f ∈ [0, 1) for vaccination in an
infected population.
Proof. Upon vaccination the system changes from state (s(τv), i(τv)) to state ((1 −
f)s(τv), i(τv)). By assumption we have that s(τv) > 0 and i(τv) > 0 for vaccination in
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an infected population. By the differential equations in (1) this implies that the deriva-
tive of s(t) directly after vaccination is negative. As G(f) = limt→+∞ s(t) (3) and s(t) is
non-increasing over time, we have that G(f) < s(τv + ) = (1− f)s(τv).
Lemma 1. The function G(f) is twice differentiable for all f ∈ [0, 1) in case of vaccination
in an infected population (i0 > 0) and twice differentiable for all f ∈ [0, 1) with f 6= 1− 1σs(τv)
in case of vaccination in a completely susceptible population (the limit i0 ↓ 0).
Proof. We prove the following four statements consecutively:
(i). The function G(f) is differentiable for all f ∈ [0, 1) for vaccination in an infected
population.
(ii). In case of vaccination in a completely susceptible population (i.e., s0 > 0, i0 = 0 and
s(τv) = s0) the function G(f) is indifferentiable if and only if f
∗ = 1− 1
σs(τv)
or f = 1.
(iii). The function G(f) is twice differentiable for all f ∈ [0, 1) in case of vaccination in an
infected population.
(iv). The function G(f) is twice differentiable for all f ∈ [0, 1) except for f = f ∗ = 1− 1
σs(τ)
in case of vaccination in a completely susceptible population.
We start the proof:
(i). Note that vaccination in an infected population means i(τv) > 0 and i0 > 0 which
implies G(f) < 1
σ
by Theorem A.2. Denote by G′(f) the first order derivative of the
function G(f) with respect to f which can be obtained by taking the derivative of (6):
G′(f)
[
1− 1
σG(f)
]
=
1
σ(1− f) − s(τv) (9)
For G(f) = 1
σ
the function G′(f) is not defined as can be seen in (9). However, this
does not occur for vaccination in an infected population (Theorem A.2). The function
G(f) : [0, 1] → R, we analyze the boundaries f = 0 and f = 1. Because G(0) < 1
σ
by
Theorem A.2:
lim
f↓0
G′(f) =
1[
1− 1
σG(0)
] ( 1
σ
− s(τv)
)
(10)
By Theorem A.1 we have limf↑1G(f) = 0 < 1σ and thus limf↑1G
′(f) < 0.
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(ii). First we will prove that the given vaccination fractions indeed render G(f) to be indif-
ferentiable. Consider the explicit expression for G(f) in (22) and insert the parameter
settings for vaccination in a completely susceptible population and the value for f ∗:
G(f) =
−1
σ
W [−σ exp{− log(σ)− 1}] = −1
σ
W [− exp{−1}] = 1
σ
By (i) the function G(f) is indifferentiable at f ∗, because G(f ∗) = 1
σ
. The same
theorem also states that G(f) is indifferentiable at f = 1. Now we will also prove
that for vaccination in a completely susceptible population G(f) is differentiable for
all f ∈ [0, 1) for which f 6= f ∗. By definition of the Lambert W function, W (y(f)),
this function is differentiable for all y(f) /∈ {0,−1/e} (Corless et al. 1996). Let G(f) =
−1
σ
W [y(f)], with y(f) = −σs(τv)(1 − f) exp {−σs(τv)(1− f)} for vaccination in a
completely susceptible population (22). Clearly y(f) < 0, since s(τv) = s0 > 0 by
assumption and f < 1. Thus, we only need to investigate for which f the function
y(f) = − exp{−1}. Note that this only holds for: σs(τv)(1−f) = 1⇔ f = 1− 1σs(τv) =
f ∗
(iii). By (9) and (11) G(f) is twice differentiable unless one of the following conditions holds:
G(f) = 1
σ
, f = 1, G(f) = 0. In Theorem A.1 we showed that G(f) > 0 for all f ∈ [0, 1).
By Theorem A.2 we know that G(f) < 1
σ
for vaccination in an infected population and
since limf↑1G(f) = 0, part (iii) follows directly.
(iv). For vaccination in a completely susceptible population we showed that G(f) = 1
σ
⇔
f = f ∗ in part (ii), which proves part (iv).
Theorem 1. For s(τv) >
1
σ
there is a unique vaccination fraction f ∗ = 1 − 1
σs(τv)
> 0
such that the herd effect G(f) is increasing in f for all f < f ∗, maximized for f = f ∗ and
decreasing for f > f ∗. For s(τv) ≤ 1σ the function G(f) is decreasing for all f ∈ [0, 1]. If
i0 > 0, then G
′(f ∗) = 0.
Proof. Denote by G′(f) the first order derivative of the function G(f) with respect to f which
can be obtained from (6) (see (9)). By Theorem A.1 we have limf↑1G(f) = 0 and thus the
function G′(f) is not defined for f = 1. Because G(f) < 1
σ
for all f ∈ [0, 1] (Theorem A.2),
the function G(f) is maximized for f = f ∗ = 1 − 1
σs(τv)
. It is increasing for f < f ∗ and
decreasing for f > f ∗. Note that for s(τv) ≤ 1σ we get f ∗ ≤ 0 and thus the function G(f) is
only decreasing in that case.
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Lemma A.1. Let G′′(f) be the second derivative of the function G(f) with respect to f .
Then for i0 > 0 the following holds:
(i). G′′(f) = 0 if and only if G(f) = 2
σ
− (1− f)s(τv).
(ii). G′′(f) > 0 if and only if G(f) > 2
σ
− (1− f)s(τv).
(iii). G′′(f) < 0 for f ≥ 1− 1
σs(τv)
and G′′(f) < 0 if and only if G(f) < 2
σ
− (1− f)s(τv) for
f < 1− 1
σs(τv)
.
Proof. The function G′′(f) can be derived from (9):
G′′(f)
[
1− 1
σG(f)
]
=
1
σ(1− f)2 −
1
σ
[
G′(f)
G(f)
]2
G′′(f) =
G(f)2 − [G′(f)(1− f)]2
(σG(f)− 1)G(f)(1− f)2
(11)
Because limf↑1G(f) = 0 (Theorem A.1), the function G′′(f) is not defined for f = 1. We
prove the three statements of the lemma:
(i). We analyze G′′(f) = 0 and consider that G(f) < 1
σ
(Theorem A.2):
G′′(f) = 0⇔ G(f)
2 − [G′(f)(1− f)]2
(σG(f)− 1)G(f)(1− f)2 = 0
⇔ G(f)2 − [G′(f)(1− f)]2 = 0
⇔ G(f)2 =
[
[1− σ(1− f)s(τv)]G(f)
[σG(f)− 1]
]2
⇔ [1− σ(1− f)s(τv)]2 = [σG(f)− 1]2
(12)
In the second step we use that (σG(f)− 1)G(f)(1− f)2 6= 0, which holds for all f < 1
by Theorems A.1 and A.2. In the third step we substitute (9). Thus G′′(f) = 0 if and
only if one of the following two relations holds:
1− σ(1− f)s(τv) = σG(f)− 1⇔ G(f) = 2
σ
− (1− f)s(τv) if f < 1− 1
σs(τv)
1− σ(1− f)s(τv) = 1− σG(f)⇔ G(f) = (1− f)s(τv) if f > 1− 1
σs(τv)
By Theorem A.3 G(f) < (1− f)s(τv) which implies that the second relation does not
hold. Thus, G′′(f) = 0 if and only if the first relation holds. The function G′′(f) = 0
on the interval [0, 1− 1
σs(τv)
] for the value of f which satisfies G(f) = 2
σ
− (1− f)s(τv).
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(ii). Consider the second expression in (11), by Theorems A.1 and A.2 we have: (σG(f)−
1)G(f)(1− f)2 < 0 for f < 1 From (12) we derive:
G′′(f) > 0⇔ G(f)2 − [G′(f)(1− f)]2 < 0
⇔ G(f)2 <
[
[1− σ(1− f)s(τv)]G(f)
[σG(f)− 1]
]2
⇔ [1− σ(1− f)s(τv)]2 > [σG(f)− 1]2
Thus G′′(f) > 0 if and only if one of the following two relations hold:
1− σ(1− f)s(τv) < σG(f)− 1⇔ G(f) > 2
σ
− (1− f)s(τv) if f < 1− 1
σs(τv)
1− σ(1− f)s(τv) > 1− σG(f)⇔ G(f) > (1− f)s(τv) if f ≥ 1− 1
σs(τv)
By Theorem A.3 the second relation cannot hold and thus G′′(f) > 0 if and only if
G(f) > 2
σ
− (1− f)s(τv), which can only hold for f < 1− 1σs(τv) .
(iii). Analogous to the previous proof we have: G′′(f) < 0⇔ [1−σ(1−f)s(τv)]2 < [σG(f)−
1]2 Thus, G′′(f) < 0 if and only if one of the following two relations hold:
1− σ(1− f)s(τv) > σG(f)− 1⇔ G(f) < 2
σ
− (1− f)s(τv) if f < 1− 1
σs(τv)
1− σ(1− f)s(τv) < 1− σG(f)⇔ G(f) < (1− f)s(τv) if f ≥ 1− 1
σs(τv)
By Theorem A.3 the second relation is satisfied and thus G′′(f) < 0 for all f ≥ 1− 1
σs(τv)
.
For f < 1− 1
σs(τv)
we have that G′′(f) < 0 if and only if G(f) < 2
σ
− (1− f)s(τv).
Theorem A.4. The derivative of G(f) with respect to f , denoted by G′(f), is bounded from
above by s(τv), with s(τv) ≥ 0, i.e., G′(f) < s(τv) ∀f ∈ [0, 1]
Proof. From (9) we have:
G′(f)
[
1− 1
σG(f)
]
=
1
σ(1− f) − s(τv)⇔ G
′(f) =
σG(f)
σG(f)− 1 ·
1− σ(1− f)s(τv)
σ(1− f) (13)
From Lemma A.1 we note that G′(f) has an extreme under the following condition:
G(f) =
2
σ
− (1− f)s(τv) (14)
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By contradiction we assume that there exists a vaccination fraction f¯ for which G′(f¯) ≥ s(τv)
and assume that f¯ meets condition (14), then:
G′(f¯) =
2− σ(1− f¯)s(τv)
σ(1− f¯) ≥ s(τv)⇔ f¯ > 1−
1
σs(τv)
We arrive at a contradiction, because by Theorem 1 we have that G′(f) < 0 for all f >
1 − 1
σs(τv)
and s(τv) ≥ 0. Thus, G′(f) < s(τv) for all f that are an extreme for G′(f). This
completes the proof that G′(f) < s(τv) for all f ∈ (0, 1). We consider the two boundary
cases: f = 0 and f = 1. From Lemma 1 we know that limf↑1G′(f) < 0 and thus the lemma
is satisfied for f = 1. For limf↓0G′(f), we distinguish between three cases:
(i). if G′′(0) = 0: then f = 0 is an extreme of the function G′(f) for which the derivative
is strictly smaller than s(τv).
(ii). if G′′(0) > 0: then for a very small  > 0 we have G′() > limf↓0G′(f) and G′(f) < s(τv)
for all f ∈ (0, 1]. Thus also limf↓0G′(f) < s(τv).
(iii). if G′′(0) < 0: then from Lemma A.1 we have that G(0) < 2
σ
− s(τv). By (10) we have:
lim
f↓0
G′(f) =
1[
1− 1
σG(0)
] ( 1
σ
− s(τv)
)
Since G(f) < 1
σ
by Theorem A.2, we have limf↓0G′(f) < 0 in case s(τv) < 1σ . In that
case the theorem is satisfied. For s(τv) >
1
σ
we substitute G(0) < 2
σ
− s(τv) in (10):
lim
f↓0
G′(f) <
[
2− σs(τv)
1− σs(τv)
](
1− σs(τv)
σ
)
=
2
σ
− s(τv) < s(τv)
This completes the proof that G′(f) < s(τv) for all f ∈ [0, 1].
Theorem 2. Denote by W [·] the Lambert W function (cf. Appendix D) and let C be defined
as follows:
C =
W [−σ exp{−σ(s0 + i0) + log(s0)}] + 2
σ
For s(τv) > C there exists a unique vaccination fraction f¯ > 0 such that G(f) is strictly
convex (G′′(f) > 0) for all f < f¯ and strictly concave (G′′(f) < 0) for all f > f¯ . For
s(τv) ≤ C the function G(f) is concave for all f ∈ [0, 1]. If i0 > 0, then G′′(f¯) = 0.
Proof. We first prove the convex-concave shape of the function G(f) an then derive the value
C. By (11) note that G′′(f) is a continuous function for f < 1, because both G(f) and G′(f)
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are continuous by Lemma 1. Consider the function M(f) = G(f)− 2
σ
+ (1− f)s(τv). From
Lemma A.1 we have that f¯ must satisfy G(f¯) = 2
σ
− (1 − f¯)s(τv), i.e. M(f¯) = 0. Denote
by M ′(f) the derivative of M(f) with respect to f : By Theorem A.4 we have M ′(f) < 0.
This implies that M(f) = 0 has only one solution and thus there is only one f¯ for which
G′′(f¯) = 0. As G′′(f) is a continuous function this implies that on either side of f¯ the
function G(f) is either convex or concave.
By Lemma A.1 we have G′′(f) < 0 for f ≥ 1 − 1
σs(τv)
and thus G(f) is concave for
f > f¯ . Since M ′(f) < 0 and M(f¯) = 0 it holds that M(f) > 0 for f < f¯ . By Lemma A.1
this implies that G(f) is convex for all f < f¯ , which proves the convex-concave shape of
the function G(f).Note that this prove only holds for i0 > 0. In case i0 = 0 we refer to
Lemma A.2.
We now derive the value C. For certain parameter settings the function G(f) has a
convex and a concave part. By Lemma A.1 the following condition must hold for G(f) to
be convex: G(f) > 2
σ
− (1 − f)s(τv). Since G(f) is convex for all values f below a certain
threshold, the following condition requires that the function G(f) has a convex part:
G(0) >
2
σ
− s(τv) (15)
We solve above inequality with equality to obtain the value C. By substituting in (6) this
results in the following, where H(x) = −x+ 1
σ
log(x):
0 = − 2
σ
+ s(τv) +
1
σ
log
(
2
σ
− s(τv)
)
+ s0 + i0 − 1
σ
log(s0)
H
[
2
σ
− s(τv)
]
= H[s0]− i0
s(τv) =
W [−σ exp{kσ}] + 2
σ
= C with k = H[s0]− i0
We know that −1 < W [−σ exp{kσ}] < 0 (cf. Appendix D) and thus 1
σ
< C < 2
σ
. Note that
for s(τv) ≤ 1σ condition (15) is never met by Theorem A.2. By Theorem A.1 the condition
is always met for s(τv) ≥ 2σ . Thus only for s(τv) > C the function G(f) has a convex part
and for s(τv) = C we have f¯ = 0.
Lemma A.2. In case of vaccination in a completely susceptible population, the function
G(f) is convex for all f < f ∗ and concave for all f > f ∗, where f ∗ = 1− 1
σs(τv)
.
Proof. By Lemma 1(ii) we have that G(f ∗) = 1
σ
for vaccination in a completely susceptible
population. Since the vaccination fraction f ∗ also maximizes the function G(f) (Theorem 1),
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it holds that G(f) < 1
σ
for all f 6= f ∗. In Lemma A.1 we derived conditions for G(f) to be
convex or concave where we needed that G(f) < 1
σ
. These conditions can still be used if we
apply them only to f 6= f ∗.
G′′(f) > 0⇔ G(f) > 2
σ
− (1− f)s(τv) and G′′(f) < 0⇔ G(f) < 2
σ
− (1− f)s(τv)
Note that for f ∗ we have G(f ∗) = 1
σ
= 2
σ
− (1− f ∗)s(τv). By Theorem 1 the function G(f)
is decreasing for f > f ∗, whereas the expression 2
σ
− (1 − f)s(τv) is increasing in f . This
implies that G(f) is concave for all f > f ∗. The function G(f) is increasing for f < f ∗, just
as the expression on the right hand side in the conditions for convexity and concavity. By
Theorem A.4 the expression 2
σ
− (1 − f)s(τv) increases with a faster rate than G(f). This
implies that G(f) is convex for all f < f ∗.
Theorem A.5. The fraction of people not infected during the epidemic, F (f) = fs(τv) +
G(f), is increasing in f for all f ∈ [0, 1).
Proof. Let F ′(f) denote the derivative of F (f) with respect to f : F ′(f) = d
df
F (f) = s(τv) +
G′(f) By Theorem 1 G′(f) > 0 for all f < 1 − 1
σs(τv)
and G′(f) < 0 for all f > 1 − 1
σs(τv)
.
Because s(τv) > 0 the function F (f) is increasing for all f < 1− 1σs(τv) . The function F (f)
is increasing under the following condition:
F ′(f) = s(τv) +G′(f) =
σG(f)
σG(f)− 1
[
1
σ(1− f) − s(τv)
]
+ s(τv)
=
1
σG(f)− 1
[
G(f)
σ(1− f) − s(τv)
]
> 0
By Theorem A.2 F ′(f) > 0 if and only if G(f) < (1−f)s(τv), which holds by Theorem A.3
for all f ∈ [0, 1). Thus the function F (f) is increasing for all f ∈ [0, 1).
Corollary 1. The function D(f) as defined by (7) is maximized by the unique vaccination
fraction f˜ for which G′(f˜) = D(f). The function D(f) is increasing for f < f˜ and decreasing
for f > f˜ .
Proof. The function D(f) is defined as follows: D(f) = 1
f
[G(f)−G(0)].
d
df
D(f) =
1
f
[G′(f)−D(f)]
d2
df 2
D(f) =
1
f
G′′(f)− 2
f 2
[G′(f)−D(f)]
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By the first derivative of D(f), f˜ is clearly an extreme of the function D(f). Observe that
in the limit f ↓ 0 is always a solution of the condition G′(f˜) = D(f), by definition of the
derivative. For parameter settings for which the function G(f) does not have a convex part,
the function D(f) only decreases and is thus maximal for f = 0. However, if G(f) has a
convex domain, it holds that G′(f) > D(f) as long as G(f) is convex and increasing is, such
that D(f) is also increasing. This implies that f = 0 cannot maximize the function D(f) if
G(f) has a convex domain and that f˜ is in the concave domain of G(f).
Assume that f˜ is the first value in the concave domain for which G′(f˜) = D(f). Because
of concavity it holds that G(f) for all f > f˜ is below the line through G(0) and G(f˜). For
all f > f˜ this implies:
1
f
[G(f)−G(0)] < 1
f˜
[
G(f˜)−G(0)
]
Let f1 be an arbitrarily selected value greater than f˜ . Because of concavity the function G(f)
for all f > f1 is below the line through G(0) and G(f1). This implies that D(f) is decreasing
for f > f˜ . Thus, there is only one strictly positive solution for the condition G′(f) = D(f),
which is in the concave and increasing domain of G(f). By the second derivative of D(f), f˜
gives a maximum.
Lemma 2. Consider the following three vaccination fractions: f¯ as defined in Theorem 2,
the dose-optimal vaccination fraction f˜ and f ∗ as defined in Theorem 1. The following
relation holds: f¯ ≤ f˜ ≤ f ∗
Proof. By Lemma A.1 we know that G′′(f) ≤ 0 ⇔ G(f) ≤ 2
σ
− (1 − f)s(τv). Filling in
the expression for f ∗ = 1− 1
σs(τv)
results in G(f ∗) ≤ 1
σ
. This clearly holds by Theorem A.2
and thus f¯ ≤ f ∗, due to Theorem 2. The optimal vaccination fraction f˜ is defined as the
fraction that maximizes the function D(f) and meets the condition G′(f˜) = D(f˜). Observe
that D(f˜) ≥ 0, because limf↓0D(f) = 0. This implies that G′(f˜) ≥ 0 and thus f˜ ≤ f ∗ by
Theorem 1. By argument we showed in Corollary 1 that f˜ cannot be in the convex domain
of the function G(f), such that f¯ ≤ f˜ .
Lemma 3. For increasing σ the dose-optimal vaccine fraction f˜ converges to f ∗.
Proof. The basic reproduction ratio is denoted by σ. By Lemma 2 it suffices to show that
limσ↑+∞ f ∗ − f¯ = 0. By definition we have limσ↑+∞ f ∗ = limσ↑+∞ 1− 1σs(τv) = 1. Clearly, for
σ ↑ +∞ and f¯ = 1 the condition G(f¯) = 2
σ
− (1 − f¯ s(τv)) is satisfied. This completes the
proof.
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Theorem 6. The value f˜ , which maximizes D(f) = [G(f)−G(0)]/f , decreases when s(τv)
decreases.
Proof. Let K(f) and K ′(f) denote respectively the derivative of G(f) and G′(f) with respect
to s(τv). The functions K(f) and K
′(f) can be determined from (6):
K(f)
[
1− 1
σG(f)
]
= −f and K ′(f)
[
1− 1
σG(f)
]
= −1−G′(f)K(f) 1
σG(f)2
Remark that G(f) is increasing in s(τv), because G(f) <
1
σ
by Theorem A.2 and thus
K(f) > 0.
Define the function C(f) = G(f)−G(0)− fG′(f). The vaccination fraction f˜ is charac-
terized by the unique solution to C(f) = 0. For f < f˜ we have C(f) < 0 and for f > f˜ we
have C(f) > 0. We consider how the function C(f) changes with s(τv):
∂
∂s(τv)
C(f) =
∂
∂s(τv)
(G(f)−G(0)− fG′(f)) = K(f)− fK ′(f) =
fG′(f)K(f) 1
σG(f)2[
1− 1
σG(f)
]
Above expression is negative at f˜ , because G(f) is increasing for f˜ , K(f) > 0 and G(f) < 1
σ
.
This implies that C(f˜) > 0 for any s < s(τv). Thus, the peak of D(f) for s < s(τv) is attained
at a value f < f˜ , for f˜ maximizing D(f) for s(τv). This completes the proof.
Theorem A.6. Let f¯ be the value for which G′′(f¯) = 0 and f ∗ for which G′(f ∗) = 0. Both
f¯ and f ∗ decrease when s(τv) decreases.
Proof. The peak of G(f) is attained at f ∗ = 1 − 1
σs(τv)
. Thus, f ∗ decreases when s(τv)
decreases. For f¯ it holds that G(f¯) = 2
σ
− (1− f¯)s(τv). When s(τv) decreases to s2(τv), the
right side of this expression increases. From Theorem 6 we know that G(f) is increasing in
s(τv), because the derivative K(f) > 0. With s(τv) decreasing, also G(f¯) decreases to G2(f¯).
This implies that G2(f¯) <
2
σ
− (1− f¯)s2(τv). This implies that our initial f¯ is already in the
concave part when s(τv) decreases and thus the value for f where the function G(f) goes
from concave to convex, denoted by f¯ also decreases if s(τv) decreases.
Appendix B Generality of the function G(f )
One of the extensions to the standard SIR compartmental model, is the SInR model with
n different consecutive infectious stages. Let s(t) and r(t) denote the fraction of people
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respectively susceptible and removed at time t. The fractions of people susceptible in every
state are given by ik(t) for k = 1, ..., n. Interpretation dictates that s(t)+
∑n
k=1 ik(t)+r(t) = 1
for all t. Let βk and γk denote respectively the transmission rate and recovery rate in
infectious stage k. The differential equations for the SInR model are:
ds
dt
= −s
n∑
k=1
βkik
di1
dt
= s
n∑
k=1
βkik − γ1i1
dik
dt
= γk−1ik−1 − γkik k = 2, ..., n
dr
dt
= γnin
(16)
Theorem 3. Up to a constant, the expression for G(f) given in (6) also applies to the SInR
model with σ =
∑n
k=1
βk
γk
.
Proof. The following relation can be derived from (16), using σ =
∑n
k=1
βk
γk
.
∫ ∞
0
1
s(t)
ds = −
n∑
k=1
βk
∫ ∞
0
ik(t)dt
log(s(t))− log(s(0)) = −
n∑
k=1
βk
γk
[Gk(t)−Gk(0)]
= σ
[
s(t) +
n∑
k=1
ik(t)
]
− σ
[
s(0) +
n∑
k=1
ik(0)
]
−
n∑
k=1
βk
γk
[
n∑
m=k+1
im(t)− im(0)
]
(17)
We let t → ∞ and assume that ik(∞) = 0 for k = 1, ..., n. This results in the following
expression, which is equal to the expression for the SIR model up to a constant:
0 = −s(∞) + 1
σ
log(s(∞))− 1
σ
log(s(0)) + s(0) +
n∑
k=1
ik(0)− 1
σ
n∑
k=1
βk
γk
n∑
m=k+1
im(0) (18)
Assume that we vaccinate a fraction f of the susceptible people at time τv. Analogous to
the analysis of the SIR model, we let ((1 − f)s(τv), i1(τv), ..., in(τv)) be a new initial state
and define the value s(∞) according to (18). The values for ik(τv) for k = 1, ..., n can be
calculated according to (17). We define G(f) = limt→∞ s(t), where s(t) follows (16) for
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t > τv. This results in the following:
0 = −G(f)+ 1
σ
log(G(f))− 1
σ
log(s(0)(1−f))+s(0)+
n∑
k=1
ik(0)−fs(τv)− 1
σ
n∑
k=1
βk
γk
n∑
m=k+1
im(0)
(19)
Above expression equals the expression for the SIR model (6) up to a constant.
Corollary 2. The results of Lemma 1, Theorem 1, Theorem 2 and Corollary 1 also apply
to the SInR model with σ =
∑n
k=1
βk
γk
.
Proof. By Theorem 3 the expression for G(f) in the SInR model is equal to the expression
in the SIR model up to a constant. This constant disappears after taking the derivative,
implying that the first and second order derivative do not change. The structural properties
of the function G(f) thus carry over.
Appendix C Optimal vaccine allocation - Theorems
and proofs
Theorem 2 establishes that Problem (5) is a resource allocation problem with an S-shaped
objective function: non-decreasing and convex for all x smaller than some value xˆ and concave
for all x > xˆ (cf. Ginsberg (1974) and Ag˘ralı and Geunes (2009)). As the vaccine allocation
problem is a maximization problem with inequality constraints, necessary conditions for
the optimum are given by the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions. Let ω be the KKT
multiplier for the capacity constraint, λj for the non-negativity constraint fj ≥ 0 for all
j ∈ J and µj for the constraint fj ≤ 1 for all j ∈ J . Denote by f ,λ, µ the vectors with the
variables fj, λj and µj respectively. Let L(f ,λ, µ, ω) denote the Lagrange function of the
maximization problem. The KKT conditions for this problem are given in (20). Observe
that the term partial pro rata follows from the KKT condition that the partial derivative of
L(f ,λ, µ, ω) with respect to fj equals 0 for all j ∈ J .
L(f ,λ, µ, ω) =
∑
j∈J
NjFj(fj)− ω
(∑
j∈J
fjsj(τv,j)Nj − V
)
−
∑
j∈J
(µj(fj − 1)− λjfj)
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∂∂fj
L(f ,λ, µ, ω) = 0 ∀j ∈ J
ω
(∑
j∈J
fjsj(τv,j)Nj − V
)
= 0 ω ≥ 0
λjfj = 0 ∀j ∈ J λj ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ J
µj(fj − 1) = 0 ∀j ∈ J µj ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ J
(20)
Lemma C.1. The vaccine allocation problem always has a solution for which
∑
j∈J fjsj(τv,j)Nj =
V .
Proof. Let xj for all j ∈ J be a solution of the vaccine allocation problem and assume that∑
j∈J xjsj(τv,j)Nj < V . Let yj for all j ∈ J be the solution for which yj ≥ xj for all j ∈ J ,
such that
∑
j∈J yjsj(τv,j)Nj = V . By Lemma A.5 the functions Fj(f) are non-decreasing
and thus Fi(yi) ≥ Fj(xj) for all j ∈ J . This implies:
∑
j∈J NjFj(yj) ≥
∑
j∈J NjFj(xj) Above
relation proves that the proposed solution yj for all j ∈ J for which
∑
j∈J yjsj(τv,j)Nj = V
is also an optimal solution.
Theorem 4 (Central Insight). For every optimal solution to (5) there exist J ′ ⊆ J , k ∈ J\J ′
and ω ≥ 0 such that:
(i). For all j ∈ J ′, fj is the unique solution to 1sj(τv,j)F ′j(fj) = ω for which fj ≥ f¯j.
(ii). 1
sk(τv,k)
F ′k(fk) = ω, and either fk is the unique solution to this equation for which fk ≥ f¯k
or fk is the unique solution for which fk < f¯k.
(iii). Either fj = 0 or fj = 1 for all j ∈ J \ {J ′ ∪ {k}}.
Proof. The proof of this theorem consists of the following steps:
(a). Let J ′ ⊆ J such that 0 < fj < 1 for all j ∈ J ′ ∪ {k}. We prove that 1sj(τv,j)F ′j(fj) = ω
for all j ∈ J ′ ∪ {k}.
(b). We prove that for at most one population there is a strictly positive vaccination fraction
in the strictly convex domain, i.e. 0 < fj < f¯j for at most one j ∈ J ′ ∪ {k}.
We proof the two steps consecutively:
(a). This result follows from the KKT conditions. Note that for any population j for which
0 < fj < 1 the KKT conditions require that µj = 0 and λj = 0. This gives the
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following:
∂
∂fj
L(f ,λ, µ, ω) = NjF ′j(fj)− ωsj(τv,j)Nj − µj + λj
= Nj
[
F ′j(fj)− ωsj(τv,j)
]
= 0⇔ 1
sj(τv,j)
F ′j(fj) = ω
(b). By contradiction assume there is an optimal solution with at least two strictly positive
variables in the convex domain. W.l.o.g. let 0 < fj < f¯j for j = 1, 2, i.e. the
functions F1(f) and F2(f) are convex at respectively f1 and f2. By the KKT conditions
F ′1(f1) = F
′
2(f2). Choose an 0 <  < min
{
f1, f2
N2s2(τv,2)
N1s1(τv,1)
, f¯1 − f1, (f¯2 − f2)N2s2(τv,2)N1s1(τv,1)
}
and let δ = N1s1(τv,1)
N2s2(τv,1)
such that:
f1s1(τv,1)N1 + f2s2(τv,1)N2 = (f1 + )s1(τv,1)N1 + (f2 − δ)s2(τv,2)N2
By convexity of F1(f1) and F2(f2) the following can be derived:
N1F1(f1+)+N2F2(f2−δ) > N1F1(f1)+N2F2(f2)+N1[F ′1(f1)−F ′2(f2)] = N1F1(f1)+N2F2(f2)
Above relation shows that the objective function can be improved by a small change
in the allocation. Thus, a solution with more than one strictly positive variable in the
convex domain can never be optimal.
Lemma C.2. If sj(τv,j) >
1
σj
for all j ∈ J , then there is no optimal solution to (5) for which
fj = 0 and fk = 1 for two populations j, k ∈ J . This implies that (iii) of Theorem 4 changes
into: Either fj = 0 for all j ∈ J \ {J ′ ∪ {k}} or fj = 1 for all j ∈ J \ {J ′ ∪ {k}}.
Proof. By contradiction assume that f1 = 0 and f2 = 1 w.l.o.g. Let  > 0 and δ = 
N1s1(τv,1)
N2s2(τv,1)
such that:
f1s1(τv,1)N1 + f2s2(τv,2)N2 = (f1 + )s1(τv,1)N1 + (f2 − δ)s2(τv,2)N2
The following holds:
N1F1()+N2F2(1− δ)−N1F1(0)−N2F2(1) = N1[G1()−G1(0)]+N2[G2(1− δ)−G2(1)] > 0
By Theorem A.1 Gj(fj) > 0 for all 0 ≤ fj < 1 and limfj↑1Gj(fj) = 0. This implies that
the second term is positive. Furthermore, for sj(τv,j) >
1
σj
the function Gj(f) is initially
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increasing by Theorem 1, implying that G1() > G1(0). Thus, a small change in allocation
can improve the solution. We arrive at a contradiction and thus the proof of the lemma is
completed.
Theorem 5. Consider a set of populations J with ∀j: Fj(f) = F (f) and a total available
amount of resources equal to V . Let b = V
s(τv)
, |J | = n and order the populations such that
N1 ≤ ... ≤ Nn. The optimal allocation for particular cases is as follows:
(a). if b < f˜N1, then allocate only to the smallest population. Set f1 = b/N1 and fj = 0 for
j = 2, ..., n.
(b). if b =
∑
j∈K f˜Nj for a subset K ⊆ J , then set xj = f˜ for j ∈ K and xj = 0 for j /∈ K.
(c). if b >
∑
j∈J f˜Nj, then allocate pro rata over all the populations: xj =
b∑
j∈J Nj
for all
j ∈ J .
Proof. (a). Step (b) in the proof of Theorem 4 shows that an optimal allocation results
in at most one strictly positive vaccination fraction in the convex domain. By this
result, the proposed allocation follows directly from convexity of the function G(f) for
all f < f¯ < f˜ .
(b). The proposed allocation results in the maximum attainable value for the objective
function for V = bs(τv) available vaccines and is thus optimal.
(c). We prove the optimality of the proposed allocation using the items of Theorem 4.
Consider item (iii): for the special case an allocation with fj = 1 and fk < 1 for
arbitrary populations j, k ∈ J cannot be optimal:
NjF (fj − ) +NkF
(
fk + 
Nj
Nk
)
−NjF (fj)−NkF (fk) = Nj(F (fk)− F (fj)) > 0
The same holds for an allocation with fj > f¯ and fk < f¯ . For the given amount of
vaccines this also implies that fj > f˜ , such that:
NjF (fj − ) +NkF
(
fk + 
Nj
Nk
)
−NjF (fj)−NkF (fk)
= Nj[F (fj − )− F (fj)] +Nk
[
F
(
fk + 
Nj
Nk
)
− F (fk)
]
> 0
By item (i) and (ii) of Theorem 4 the optimal allocation for b >
∑
j∈J f˜Nj is thus a
pro rata allocation over the populations K ⊆ J . Remains to prove that it is optimal
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to allocate pro rata over all populations, i.e. K = J . Let zj denote the pro rata
allocation over K ⊂ J and xj the pro rata allocation over all populations in J . Denote
zˆ = b∑
j∈K Nj
and xˆ = b∑
j∈J Nj
and remark that zˆ > xˆ > f˜ . This implies the following:
[F (zˆ)− F (0)]/zˆ < [F (xˆ)− F (0)]/xˆ∑
j∈K
NjF (zˆ)−
∑
j∈K
NjF (0) <
∑
j∈J
NjF (xˆ)−
∑
j∈J
NjF (0)∑
j∈K
NjF (zˆ) +
∑
j /∈K
NjF (0) <
∑
j∈J
NjF (xˆ)
Above inequality proves that if b is allocated pro rata over the populations of a subset
of J , every strict subset will result in a lower objective function. Therefore, it is best
to allocate the available amount pro rata over all the populations.
Appendix D The Lambert W function
This appendix considers the Lambert W function, or product log function (cf. Corless et al.
(1996)). The Lambert W function, W (x), solves x = W (x)eW (x). In this study we consider
only real valued x and the function W (x) is then defined only for x ≥ −1
e
. For x ∈ [−1
e
, 0]
the function W (x) has two values, but two branches of W (x) can be defined that are both
single valued. The constraint W (x) ≤ −1 can be added to construct the branch W−1(x)
defined only for x ∈ [−1
e
, 0]. The other branch W0(x) holds for all x ≥ −1e and meets the
constraint W (x) ≥ −1. This branch is also referred to as the principal branch, denoted by
Wp(x).
D.1 Lambert W function for the final size
To study the final size in an epidemic, the fraction of people still susceptible when the
pandemic has died out, denoted by G(f) can be expressed using the Lambert W function
(cf. Ma and Earn (2006)). Let Wp(x) be the principal branch of the Lambert W function
which by definition solves the following expression for x ≥ −1
e
:
x = W (x)eW (x). (21)
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Using the Lambert W function, the function G(f) can be expressed as:
G(f) =
−1
σ
W (−σ exp{−σB(f)})
with B(f) = s0 + i0 − 1
σ
log(s0(1− f))− fs(τv)
(22)
which can be verified by substituting (22) into (21), which leads to (6).
Let G(f) = −1
σ
W [y(f)], with y(f) = −σs0(1 − f) exp {−σ(s0 + i0 − fs(τv))} (22). We
will study y(f) in more detail to determine which branch of the Lambert W function is
needed for the calculation of G(f).
Theorem D.1. −1
e
≤ y(f) ≤ 0
Proof. Because σ > 0, we have y(f) ≤ 0. Analyze the extreme values of y(f):
d
df
y(f) = σs0 exp {−σ(s0 + i0 − fs(τv))} [1− σs(τv)(1− f)] = 0⇔ f = 1− 1
σs(τv)
It suffices to show that y(f) ≥ −1
e
for f = 1− 1
σs(τv)
:
− s0
s(τv)
exp{−σ(s0 + i0 − s(τv))− 1} ≥ −1
e
log(s0)− σ (s0 + i0 − s(τv)) ≤ log(s(τv))
0 ≤ −s(τv) + 1
σ
log(s(τv)) + s0 + i0 − 1
σ
log(s0)
By (2) above relation holds, because i(τv) ≥ 0.
By Theorem A.2 we know that G(f) < 1
σ
and thus −1 < W (−σ exp{−σB(f, σ)}) < 0.
By Theorem D.1 we have that only the principal branch W0(x) is needed for G(f) (22).
Appendix E Interacting populations
In Section 5.4 the optimal allocation is analyzed for weakly interacting populations. In
this appendix three figures are presented with the optimal allocation for increasing levels of
interaction. Figures 7, 8 and 9 display the optimal allocation in case interaction between
populations is respectively 0.02, 0.05 and 0.1 times the interaction within a population. This
corresponds to interaction between populations being a factor 50, 20 or 10 times weaker than
interaction within a population. The figures are discussed in Section 5.4.
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Each of the graphs present the optimal vaccine allocation (the solid lines) over three
interacting populations for different sizes of vaccine stockpile. The dashed and dotted lines
indicate the important vaccination fractions: the dashed line in the middle equals V˜j =
f˜jsj(τv,j)Nj, the upper dotted line equals V
∗
j = f
∗
j sj(τv,j)Nj and the lower dotted line equals
V¯j = f¯jsj(τv,j)Nj.
Figure 7: The optimal allocation in case interaction between populations is 0.02 times the
interaction within a population.
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Figure 8: The optimal allocation in case interaction between populations is 0.05 times the
interaction within a population.
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Figure 9: The optimal allocation in case interaction between populations is 0.1 times the
interaction within a population.
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